We need to include (and modify) a browser on a USB that leaves as little trace as possible of its existence. I know there are things that we can't do anything about (like shellbags and prefetch-cache entries) that show something was run, but we're mostly concerned with browser data. The TOR browser bundle claims to have patched a few other things that aren't cache-related (I think). The quote is:
'prevent the permissions manager from recording HTTPS STS state
prevent intermediate SSL certificates from being recorded
prevent the clipboard cache from being written to disk for large pastes
prevent the content preferences service from recording site zoom.
The full page is https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/#Implementation section 4.3 (Disk Avoidance).
Are these also addressed in Firefox Portable?
Thx in advance
Drew
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Doing those would honestly be pretty silly considering that your traffic is easily monitored by the network administrator anyway. No changes above using the -profile switch and portablizing the profile are made to Firefox. Changing those types of settings would not be permitted under our agreement with Mozilla.
Keep in mind that you can not modify and distribute Firefox or Firefox Portable without permission from Mozilla.
Sometimes, the impossible can become possible, if you're awesome!
Wow! That was fast! I really appreciate your response. In our case, the scenario is not online monitoring concerns - and traffic would be tunneled out of the PC so it will all look like 443 traffic on the network. I also don't see how the 'cut/paste buffer disable' would be seen online anyway. This would be part of a security product, where the concern is black-hat access to the PC after a web session was conducted from the USB. And I misspoke on 'modify' - it would be in the form of an add-on/extension. The Tor developers seemed to think all of the things I pointed out were worth addressing for security/privacy concerns.
I also recognize that I think the primary goal for this product is portability more than this level of privacy. I have to evaluate a lot of potential situations. Thanks again for so quickly responding and answering.
Sure thing.
Unfortunately, anything other than distributing our signed binary installers or doing a default install to a device for sale without starting it or altering a single file is considered an alteration and requires permission from Mozilla. Installing an extension before you give it to your customer is a modification.
Sometimes, the impossible can become possible, if you're awesome!